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This article describes the campaign developed by unions, human rights organisations and other 
social movements in Argentina at the end of  the 1990s in order to push the government to 
implement measures to eliminate poverty and extreme poverty. It also refers to the results of  this 
campaign in the following years, highlighting not only its direct impact but also its indirect 
consequences in the medium term, in particular on the public debates related to the social policies 
implemented by the new centre–left government since 2003. This campaign, popularly known as 
FRENAPO (National Front Against Poverty), was organised in the context of  the implementation 
of  neo-liberal macroeconomic policies in Argentina, which led the country to the biggest crisis in its 
history at the end of  2001. The members of  the campaign proposed a package of  economic and 
social measures oriented to unemployed workers (a basic income grant plus a professional education 
scheme), to the children and to the elderly (a basic income grant for both). The proposal was 
supported in a referendum by more than three million people all over the country during December 
2001, but it was not considered by the Parliament. Although the alliance that supported FRENAPO 
eventually crumbled, the campaign was successful in its objective of  influencing the public debates 
on how to respond to poverty and extreme poverty. Several measures implemented by the new 
centre–left government since 2003 were inspired by those debates, particularly those aimed at 
guaranteeing an income for children and the elderly. This article analyses the context of  the 
campaign, identifies its concrete goals, origins and members, and explains how FRENAPO built 
power in order to achieve those objectives. Finally, it addresses the main consequences of  




If  today concepts like ‘Asignación Universal por Hijo’, ‘Plan Jefes y Jefas de Familia’ o ‘Seguro para la vejez’ sound 
familiar, that is because, among other reasons, ten years ago the Argentinean Workers Union took the political 




A Brief Overview of the National Front Against Poverty2
This article analyses a campaign furthered and developed by a number of  social organisations 
in Argentina at the end of  the 1990s. The main objective of  the National Front Against Poverty 
(FRENAPO) was to push the government to carry out measures that would eliminate poverty and 
extreme poverty. The article also discusses this campaign’s results and impact in the following years, 
highlighting not only its direct impact but also its indirect medium-term consequences, particularly 
how the public debates since 2003 related to the new centre–left government’s social policies. 
During the 1990s Argentina’s economy had a neo-liberal orientation. In particular, the 
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government implemented a structural adjustment programme consisting of  – among other measures 
– the privatisation of  public-owned enterprises, an international open-market orientation and the 
deregulation of  numerous sectors of  the economy. The consequences of  this macroeconomic 
framework were devastating for the working class in Argentina. Within a few years the 
unemployment rate climbed to 18% (compared to an average 6% during the 1980s), and the levels 
of  poverty and extreme poverty became the highest in the history of  the country, at least in the 
second half  of  twentieth century.3 
The resistance against these policies was led by unions and unemployed workers’ movements, 
but also included other groups such as organisations of  peasants and indigenous groups, human 
rights organisations, political parties and artists. These organisations proposed several measures to 
fight against poverty and extreme poverty, some of  which constituted the core of  the campaign 
known as the National Front Against Poverty. This campaign pointed out that the labour market was 
incapable of  responding to the challenge of  dealing with poverty and extreme poverty, and that it 
was thus necessary to push for new measures linked to citizenship rights rather than solely to labour 
rights. In particular, FRENAPO proposed a package of  economic and social measures oriented to 
unemployed workers, children and elderly people – a basic income grant for all three groups, as well 
as a professional education scheme for unemployed workers. 
Initially the campaign was focused on ensuring that the government called for a binding 
referendum on the implementation of  these measures. However, Argentina’s 2001 political situation 
meant that the organisers were faced with insurmountable obstacles. Hence, there was a political 
decision to put forward an informal referendum; this took place between 14 and 17 December 2001. 
The proposal was supported by more than three million people all over the country. However, it 
could not be presented to the Parliament due to the political turmoil that Argentina faced towards 
the end of  2001. (Between 20 December 2001 and 5 January 2002, Argentina had five different 
presidents). 
However, the campaign succeeded in its objective of  influencing public debate on dealing with 
poverty and extreme poverty, and determined the orientation of  the new government’s social 
policies. In particular, the centre–left wing Kirchnerist administration that has governed the country 
since 2003 furthered a supplementary security income benefit for children and elderly people. 
Despite the fact that these initiatives did not fit with the original FRENAPO proposals, they 
represented the campaign’s guidelines. Thus it is possible to conclude that the campaign stressed the 
need for specific measures to fight poverty and extreme poverty, and that these measures should not 
be constrained by the formal labour market. 
In the first part of  this article I analyse the context of  the campaign. In particular, I describe 
Argentina’s main economic features during the 1990s and their impact upon the labour market, 
focusing particularly on the levels of  poverty, extreme poverty and inequality. Secondly, the article 
identifies the specific goals of  the campaign, and describes its origins and members, as well as 
dealing with how FRENAPO built power in order to achieve those objectives. Finally, this paper 
discusses FRENAPO’s political implications both in the short and long term, and highlights its 
lessons for future campaigns. 
 
 
Neo-liberal Hegemony and the Reasons behind FRENAPO
The origins of  the neo-liberal policies in Argentina can be traced back to the military 
government that ruled the country between 1976 and 1983. Despite that fact, its main consequences 
upon the labour market did not come to light until the 1990s. By that time Argentina was considered 
to be the ‘best student’ the international economic institutions – the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank – could ask for, and the government pursued the path suggested by the 
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Washington Consensus.4 
It is beyond the scope of  this article to explain the reasons behind the implementation of  neo-
liberal policies in Argentina. It is possible to say, though, that a combination of  both internal and 
external causes put an end to the welfare state developed between the 1940s and the 1970s. By the 
mid-1970s, the political and economic crisis in Argentina had become deeper as a result of  the 
impact of  the international economic crisis. The 1976 coup d’état, which included around 30 000 
missing people, most of  them political activists and trade unionists, resulted in a huge change in the 
relation of  forces, which weakened working-class resistance to neo-liberal policies. The main 
consequence of  this change was that capital was able to restart the accumulation process, increasing 
the rate of  profit. 
Thus neo-liberalism was not a consequence of  a bourgeois mastermind, but the specific way 
capital found to re-establish its hegemony. In other words, neo-liberalism was a new stage in the 
history of  capitalist accumulation, characterised by a specific set of  policies, after the exhaustion of  
the welfare state. Of  course Argentina was not the only country facing these changes, although neo-
liberal policies can and do vary from country to country. However, it is not possible to analyse the 
emergence of  FRENAPO and its proposals and limits without considering the specific 
consequences of  neo-liberal policies, particularly in the labour market. 
This process was devastating for the working class. As is shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the 
average real wage in 2001 was 43% less than in 1975, the unemployment rate climbed to a 18.3% of  
the economically active population, and underemployment was 16.3% (against an average rate of  5–
6% until the 1980s), while unregistered workers at the time climbed to 38.8%.5 
 
 
Source: Graña and Kennedy (2008) 
Figure 1:  Real wages, 1974–2001 
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Source: National Institute on Statistic and Census (INDEC). 
Figure 2:  Rate of  unemployment and underemployment, 1974–2001 
 
 
In addition to those rates, inequality levels rose dramatically from 1975 to 2001. Taking into 
consideration personal income distribution levels, in 1975 the richest 10% of  the population earned 
5.4 times the income of  the poorest 10%, while in 2001 this gap grew to 29.7 times. It is also 
revealing to examine the trajectory of  inequality levels during the last decade, given the fact that the 
Argentinean economy had experienced a strong recovery before its collapse in 2001 (GDP grew 
almost 80% between 2001 and 2012), which allowed an improvement in the income distribution 
pattern: in 2012 the difference between the richest 10% and the poorest 10% was 18.6 times. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that the current gap is larger than that of  the mid-1970s (Agis, Cañete 
and Panigo, 2010; INDEC, 2001, 2012). The Gini Index is another way to assess inequality – the 
closer the value is to 0, the more equal the society; the closer it is to 1, the less equal the society. This 
index also pointed to the idea of  a massive deterioration in wages during those years. While in 1974 
the Gini coefficient was 0.36, in 2000 it reached 0.51, its highest level since it was considered in the 
official statistics (Altmir, Beccaria and Rosada, 2002).6
Finally, during the neo-liberal period poverty and extreme poverty reached the highest levels in 
the country’s history, climbing from values of  4.4% of  the population in poverty and 2% in extreme 
poverty in 1974, to 38.3% and 13.6% respectively in 2001 (Agis et al., 2010; INDEC, 2001). That 
meant that 14 million people were living in poverty, and half  of  them were children under eighteen 
years old. This was probably the most significant result of  being the ‘best student’ of  the 
international economic institutions. At the same time it contributed to setting the grounds for the 
working-class resistance against neo-liberal policies that began during the early 1990s.  
Initially there was no coordination among the organisations leading the resistance. There were 
Global Labour Journal, 2015, 6(3), Page 355 
diverse reactions, mainly organised by public workers’ unions and unemployed workers’ movements, 
particularly in small cities and towns that were affected by the privatisation of  public companies and 
the rise in unemployment levels. 
By the middle of  the 1990s social conflict emerged on a daily basis in northern provinces such 
as Jujuy, Santiago del Estero and Salta, and southern provinces such Neuquén, Río Negro and Tierra 
del Fuego. The most common action carried out by protesters was the blockage of  streets and 
roads.7 
Although there were countless protests during those years, it is possible to identify some 
important landmarks in this process: 
 
In 1991 the government decided to close an iron mine in Sierra Grande (in Río Negro 
province). As a result of  this decision, more than 1 000 workers lost their jobs and began a 
protest that involved – among a broad repertory of  strategies – the blocking of  a national 
highway. 
In 1993 Santiago del Estero’s local parliament passed an adjustment law that implied the lay-
off  of  thousands of  public workers and a reduction in their wages. In response, the local 
union movement protested in the streets for many days. The demonstrations against the 
government ended only after the local parliament was set on fire in December 1993. 
In 1995 the first killing of  a social activist (Víctor Choque) took place in the province of  
Tierra del Fuego, when the police repressed a group of  workers who were occupying a metal 
factory because their employer had not paid their salaries. 
In the provinces of  Salta and Neuquén, protests started as a consequence of  the 
privatisation of  the national oil company (YPF), which resulted in numerous dismissals of  
workers. In small towns such as Cutral-Co and Plaza Huincul in Neuquén, and Tartagal in 
Salta, the blocking of  national routes became the main strategy to put forward a strong 
protest against the government, who usually responded with both local and national police 
repression of  the demonstrators. As a result of  this repression, in 1996 Teresa Rodriguez 
was killed by the local police in the province of  Neuquén. 
In 1997 there were at least 104 blockages of  national or provincial routes, which was ten 
times the annual average of  the blockages that had taken place between 1989 and 1996. 
 
Police repression did not put a stop to the demonstrations. On the contrary, mobilisation grew 
and slowly reached the heart of  big cities, in particular Buenos Aires and its outskirts, where 40% of  
the total population of  the country lives. 
It is important to draw attention to the demonstrations’ geographical distribution because this 
was closely related to the features of  these resistance strategies. Indeed, it was only possible to put 
forward a nationally coordinated campaign once the social and political struggles reached the largest 
cities of  the country. (The biggest demonstrations between 1993 and 1999 took place more than 
1 500 km away from Buenos Aires, which had become the centre of  the protests by 2000.) By the 
end of  the 1990s the crisis had become national, and the resistance against the social consequences 
of  neo-liberal economic policies followed a similar path. As soon as this resistance became deeper, 
the different social movements that were already participating decided to coordinate more closely. 
Initially coordination involved the joint participation of  unions, unemployed workers’ 
organisations and social movements in general in the organisation of  specific activities – for 
example, a huge demonstration that marched throughout the country in 1994 (the Marcha Federal), 
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six general strikes between 1995 and 1997, and the national protest of  the Teachers’ Union 
(CTERA) between 1997 and 1999.8 The participation and commitment of  a national organisation 
was certainly necessary to plan and coordinate articulated responses. 
The Argentinean Workers’ Union (CTA) played a key role throughout this process. This 
federation was founded in 1991 by a group of  unions that broke with the General Workers 
Confederation (CGT), criticising its support of  the neo-liberal government.9 The core principle of  
the CTA consisted of  its independence from employers, political parties and the government. This 
independence allowed the CTA to support the resistance movement against the government’s 
economic policies as well as to establish alliances with other social organisations besides trade 
unions. The CTA’s responses to the changes in the formal labour market consisted of  actions related 
not only to labour rights, but also to public services and housing rights, in alliance with other locally 
based organisations. This strategy allowed the CTA to increase its membership in the informal 
sector and the unemployed – groupings which consisted of  more than half  the labour force in 
Argentina during the 1990s. 
One of  the largest alliances was known as FRENAPO, whose origins can be traced back to 
the joint activity of  trade unions and social movements during the decade of  the 1990s. The CTA 
was by far the largest promoter of  this alliance. 
The first step in building FRENAPO was the Marcha Grande, which stretched 300 km, from 
the city of  Rosario in Santa Fe to the capital city of  Buenos Aires. The march began in Rosario on 
26 July 2000, and reached Buenos Aires two weeks later. The demonstrators pleaded for a 
referendum that would force the government to implement a training and employment programme 
for unemployed householders and a basic income grant for children. 
Although the CTA was the chief  organiser, the mobilisation was supported by numerous 
other organisations such as unemployed workers’ organisations, human rights organisations and left-
wing political parties as well as by a small group of  union leaders of  the CGT. In addition, it also 
received the solidarity of  union federations from other South American countries. 
Based on the experience of  the Marcha Grande, in December 2000 these organisations decided 
to create a formal alliance as a strategy to push for those demands. The first name it got was the 
Movement for the Referendum; a call for a basic income grant for elderly people was added to the 
list of  demands. A few months later, in July 2001, the name of  the movement was changed to 
National Front Against Poverty. It was then that FRENAPO made its first official public appearance 
and established the path towards the ‘popular referendum’ that would take place five months later. 
 
 
The Campaign: Its Members, Objectives and Development
As was stated above, the CTA was the largest promoter and supporter of  FRENAPO. 
Nevertheless, its leaders believed that the campaign had to be based upon a broader alliance in order 
to allow other organisations to participate without having to subordinate themselves to the CTA’s 
general strategy. In that sense, FRENAPO worked like an umbrella organisation, allowing any 
organisation that wanted to take part in its activities to do so. In other words, the CTA assumed a 
position as first among equals, thus opening the door to other organisations that would not have 
taken part in a ‘union-based’ campaign. 
The first steps in the creation of  FRENAPO were taken by a diverse group of  social 
organisations whose activities were linked to issues like housing rights, health rights and human 
rights in addition to its main goal of  workers’ rights. It also included some employers’ organisations 
(small and medium enterprises), and small and medium farmers’ organisations. In March 2001 they 
also created a National Board, which was in charge of  promoting the activities of  FRENAPO. Table 
1 shows the main organisations that took part in the creation of  FRENAPO. It is also important to 
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mention that later on many others decided to support the campaign, in particular individuals such as 
artists, religious leaders, politicians and sportsmen (Del Frade, 2011).  
In order to encourage participation in the campaign – which was an explicit objective of  the 
alliance’s members – it was established that any member of  the Board could suggest the 
incorporation of  any other organisation or individuals, with the only requirement that they had to 
share the campaign’s objectives. The informal structure of  the campaign played an important role in 
achieving this goal. Indeed, the campaign successfully promoted this by means of  its informal 
organisational structure: on one hand, there was a simple and specific objective with a simple and 
specific proposal; on the other hand, the alliance’s internal structure was so informal that it allowed 
all sorts of  participation. 
Table 1. Founding members of FRENAPO
Organisation Field of  activity 
Argentinean Workers’ Union (CTA) Trade union 
Public Workers Association (ATE) Trade union 
Argentinean Education Workers Confederation (CTERA) Trade union 
Tire Workers Union (SUTNA) Trade union 
Argentinean Judiciary Federation (FJA) Trade union 
Land and Housing Federation (FTV) Unemployed movement 
Classist and Combative Movement (CCC) Unemployed movement 
Mothers of  May Square Human rights 
Grandmothers of  May Square  Human rights 
Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights (MEDH) Human rights 
Peace and Justice Service (SERPAJ) Human rights 
Centre of  Legal and Social Studies (CELS) Human rights  
Assembly of  Small and Medium Enterprises (APyME) Small and medium 
enterprises 
Argentinean Rural Federation (FAA) Small farmers 
Cooperative Funds Institute (IMFC) Cooperatives 
 
 
The creation of  a broad alliance was one of  the strengths of  FRENAPO, since it ensured 
strong support for its proposals among different social sectors. In addition to this, it contributed to 
building a general consensus in society that measures proposed by FRENAPO were not a sectoral 
complaint, but a necessity for the society as a whole. 
Before joining FRENAPO, the alliance members had identified poverty as the most 
imperative problem in Argentina. In fact, many of  them had played an important role throughout 
the protests during the 1990s. So, the alliance created an opportunity to pursue the implementation 
of  certain measures in order to alter the pattern of  income distribution, in the understanding that 
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the macroeconomic policies followed by the government were incapable of  dealing with those 
issues. By the time of  its foundation, there was no necessity for a strong debate among the 
FRENAPO members about the priorities that would move such an initiative. 
Behind this idea was the assumption that an explicit objective of  those macroeconomic 
policies was to increase poverty and extreme poverty. From this point of  view, the FRENAPO 
campaign can also be understood as an important step in the resistance against neo-liberalism in 
Argentina, from both ideological and organisational perspectives. On the one hand, it contributed to 
the creation of  a strong opposition to neo-liberal ideas, mainly those which explain economic 
problems as a result of  state interventions in the economy and posit that the solutions would come 
from market-based economic policies.10 On the other hand, the campaign was able to build a broad 
consensus between various organisations with different political perspectives, which turned out to be 
very important in the political scenario after the collapse of  the political and economic system at the 
end of  2001. 
The strength of  the campaign also lay in the simplicity of  its core idea. FRENAPO stressed 
that there were plenty of  resources in the country, but that there was a problem regarding their 
distribution among the population. In other words, they believed that it was possible to establish 
different strategies to alter the distribution of  these resources and thus to end poverty and extreme 
poverty. 
In order to achieve these objectives, the FRENAPO plan included:11 
 
A basic income grant for every unemployed worker. The amount of  this grant was set as 
A$38012 per month, which had to be followed by an education and training programme for 
the beneficiaries. 
A basic income grant for each child under 18 years old, equal to A$60 per month. 
A basic income grant for elderly people over 65 years, equal to the minimum pension of  
A$150 per month. 
 
The amount of  the grants was determined by considering what resources were vital for a 
family to satisfy its basic needs. By October 2001, the National Institute on Statistics and Census 
established that a family of  five people (two adults and three children) needed A$504 per month to 
live above the poverty line and A$205 per month to live above the extreme poverty line. 
The FRENAPO programme pointed to potential economic resources that could go into the 
grants, and how this should be put into practice. The specific economic calculations were provided 
by FRENAPO economists. These calculations were quite important because they tried to show that 
the campaign was not a mere complaint about the consequences of  the neo-liberal macroeconomic 
policies, but a comprehensive proposal based upon an entirely different orientation towards the 
country’s economy (even though it did not imply a radical change in the social relations of  
production). 
Overall, the measures posited by FRENAPO required A$9 700 million per year. This amount 
of  money could have been drawn from different sources, such as: 
  
the elimination of  income tax exemptions (A$5 700 million);  
the removal of  tax benefits for banks, large retail companies and privatised public service 
companies (A$1 500 million);  
the creation of  a new tax on luxury goods (A$1 000 million);  
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the reallocation of  existing resources on social policies (A$1 000 million); and  
the removal of  subsides for privatised companies (A$500 million). 
 
The first objective of  the campaign was, as stated above, to push for a mandatory referendum 
that, according to Article 40 of  the National Constitution, required the approval of  the National 
Parliament. This procedure enables the Parliament to submit a legal initiative for consideration of  
the people by means of  a compulsory referendum. However, the FRENAPO leadership soon 
realised that the government was not planning to permit such an initiative. Consequently, they 
decided to turn the campaign into a massive political denouncement of  the neo-liberal economic 
framework and its consequences. The mandatory referendum, therefore, became an informal 
referendum, which was organised and carried out by FRENAPO from 14 to 17 December 2001. 
In the months preceding the referendum, FRENAPO’s activity was quite intense. It included 
the participation of  its members in massive demonstrations around the country, such as the one 
against the implementation of  the America Free Trade Area (ALCA) initiative in April, a national 
strike in August and a march to the National Parliament in October. These activities were part of  the 
resistance against neo-liberalism in Argentina, and FRENAPO members took part in all of  them, 
even if  they were not organised by the alliance.  
The most important demonstration organised by FRENAPO took place in September 2001, 
when seven groups of  militants departed from Buenos Aires and headed towards different key 
regions of  the country. Each group was led by a FRENAPO member and had the mission of  
organising meetings along the way to discuss and publicise the programme. The campaign process 
took nearly a full year, from its initial steps in December 2000 to the holding of  the informal 
referendum in December 2001. 
In the meantime, the structure of  the alliance had become more complex, although without 
losing its original flexibility. This structure combined national and local levels. On the one hand, it 
had a national coordination committee that reached its decisions by consensus, and was responsible 
for the elaboration of  the campaign’s general guidelines (in particular, preparation and distribution 
of  ballot papers and boxes, and the establishment of  relationships with national media and 
government authorities).  
On the other hand, there were numerous local committees throughout the entire country. In 
fact, the development of  the entire campaign was possible because of  these local FRENAPO 
committees that were created whenever and wherever possible. These committees were responsible 
for the propaganda and coordination of  the campaign at local level. They also gave prominence to 
local organisations, and contributed to strengthening linkages at the local level. Although there was a 
national coordination committee, the heart of  the FRENAPO campaign was based on these local 
milestones. In fact, the rules of  the Movement for the Referendum stated that it would be an 
independent decision of  the local organisations on how to organise the activities, the funding and 
the location of  the FRENAPO office at the local level, with the only limitation being that they had 
to respect the objectives of  the campaign. Initially fifty-six local committees were created, but later 
many more were founded throughout the country. This decentralisation was an important issue in 
the structure of  FRENAPO, and it helped to avoid the accusation that the alliance was an initiative 
that concerned only the big cities. There is no information about how many local committees were 
created before the referendum took place in December 2001, but many members of  FRENAPO 
said that there were at least a hundred committees all around the country. 
Trade unions played a key role in these committees, and many of  them were founded in union 
buildings and funded by unions. (Although there was no specific rule on how to fund the activities 
of  FRENAPO, most were supported by the unions, which were the biggest organisations within the 
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alliance.) This particular structure allowed the participants to organise periodic meetings and to 
adjust the strategy to each region’s specific needs (whether they were big cities or small towns). Once 
again, there were no national guidelines on how to function at the local level. The only general 
suggestion was that all the activities had to focus on the general objective of  guaranteeing popular 
participation in the referendum. 
The referendum started on 14 December 2001, and took place over four days. During those 
days FRENAPO sent over 20 000 ballot boxes throughout the country. Each of  them was not only 
a place of  voting, but also a space to deepen the propaganda strategy, gathering people together and 
furthering the proposal’s discussion. The referendum turned into a massive mobilisation of  social 
and political militants throughout the country, and each voting place became a site of  debate among 
the electors. Despite the fact that it was not a formal space of  discussion, militants used it to further 
their political perspectives regarding the alliance and the local political situation. 
The result of  the referendum was powerful: over 3.1 million people supported the proposal 
and only 20 000 people rejected it. This was the biggest public rejection of  the consequences of  the 
neo-liberal economic policies in over a decade. In order to allow a comparison, it is possible to note 
that in the 2003 presidential election almost 20 million people voted, which means that around 15% 
of  the effective voters in a mandatory election decided to take part in the FRENAPO referendum. 
Once the referendum was finished, the question was what to do with this huge support and 
how to turn it into political, social and economic change. FRENAPO was unable to respond to that 
challenge. This was one of  the most important weaknesses of  the campaign. There should have 
been a plan for the day after the referendum, but FRENAPO did not think beyond the campaign. 
After years of  resistance against neo-liberalism, and after a huge mobilisation around a concrete 
proposal, the members of  the alliance did not know what to do with the political power they had 
accumulated throughout the campaign. As a consequence of  this weakness, FRENAPO was unable 
to function as the leader of  the political process that emerged after the crisis that Argentina faced 
just a few days after the campaign.  
 
 
FRENAPO from the 2001 Crisis to the Universal Child Allocation
There are many factors that help to explain why the FRENAPO programme could not be 
achieved. The first of  them is related to the economic situation that Argentina faced from the end 
of  the 1990s until the end of  2002: its economy was in recession during that period, the longest in 
the history of  the country. 
The popular referendum organised by FRENAPO took place on December 2001. Two days 
later, hundreds of  demonstrations throughout the country demanded the resignation of  the 
president and a deep and complete change in the country’s economic policies. The last chapter of  
this story is well known. The government repressed the protests, killing more than thirty people 
throughout the last days of  December 2001. Nevertheless, the president was forced to resign and 
Argentina experienced a period of  political and economic instability, which included the succession 
of  five different presidents in a few weeks, the devaluation of  the national currency, and the default 
on its external debt. By the end of  2001 FRENAPO had a proposal supported by more than three 
million people, but there was no functioning government to receive and analyse it. 
The already critical social situation became even worse throughout 2002. The unemployment 
rate jumped to 21.5%, poverty to 57.5% and extreme poverty reached 27.5%. In January 2002 
Eduardo Duhalde was appointed as national president by the Parliament; he ruled the country until 
May 2003. In this particular context the proposal of  FRENAPO was still relevant; the transitional 
government took its main idea and implemented the Unemployed Heads of  Household Programme 
(Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados). 
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This social programme established an income grant of  A$150 for every unemployed 
householder. It was implemented in less than three months, and reached over two million people. 
However, it is not possible to match this programme with that of  FRENAPO, whose members did 
not participate in the design of  this one. For one thing, the amount of  money assigned by the Plan 
Jefes y Jefas was not enough to raise people above the poverty line; as a matter of  fact, it represented 
only about one-third of  the FRENAPO proposal. In addition, there was no specific consideration 
for children and elderly people. Moreover, the government decided to close the entry to the 
programme in June 2002, thus denying access to newly unemployed people. These restrictions 
denatured the FRENAPO objectives, and many of  its members strongly criticised the Plan Jefes y 
Jefas, pointing out that it was a bad copy of  the proposal supported by the campaign in December 
2001. 
In 2003 general elections resulted in the formation of  a new centre–left government. Faced 
with the social crisis, its first reaction was to decide that poverty and extreme poverty should be 
considered from the perspective of  labour-market institutions. Indeed, the government stated that 
the priority was to create employment and to strengthen formal labour relations. Once again, the 
FRENAPO proposal was not considered as a valid measure to respond to the social crisis. (The 
proposal of  the campaign was renewed by the CTA in 2005 but it was rejected by the government 
[Rameri, Raffo and Lozano, 2005].)   
The strategy focused on the labour market institutions was quite successful for a time – 
unemployment rates decreased from 17.3% in 2003 to 8.5% in 2007, and the rate of  informal 
workers decreased from 45.1% in 2003 to 40.4% in 2007 (INDEC, 2003, 2007). However, the 
dynamism of  the labour market became weaker in 2007 and the social question was again put at the 
centre of  public debates, especially after the economic crisis towards the end of  2008. 
The government realised that a different approach to deal with these issues was necessary and 
in 2009, after a defeat in the mid-term elections, decided to introduce a significant change in its 
social policy. The spirit of  the FRENAPO proposal returned in the form of  a measure that 
implemented a conditional cash transfer programme known as Asignación Universal por Hijo (Universal 
Child Allocation, AUH). This programme provided for a transfer of  money to the parents of  poor 
households for each child under 18 years old. The amount of  the grant was originally A$180 per 
child per month,13 and the programme required that both parents were unemployed or not earning 
more than the minimum wage. The AUH has been the largest social programme in Argentinean 
history, assisting around 3.7 million children, and despite its critics, the impressive results are 
undeniable (Dobrusin, 2010).  
The implementation of  this programme was followed by an important change in the pension 
system. In particular, the government took two measures that were quite remarkable. In 2008 the 
pension system was nationalised after its privatisation in 1994; in addition, the government 
implemented a mechanism to facilitate access to a minimum pension for every adult over 65 years of  
age.  
It is possible to consider these two initiatives – the AUH and the changes in the pension 
system – to be part of  the legacy of  the FRENAPO campaign. As was stated above, FRENAPO 
was unable to go beyond the campaign, and the alliance itself  broke up after the election of  a new 
centre–left administration in 2003. However, most of  its ideas influenced the social policies 
implemented throughout the decade that followed its peak. 
By the middle of  the first decade of  the twenty-first century, the FRENAPO alliance was 
definitely over. As soon as the new government implemented, at least partially, the agenda that was 
supported by these 1990s social movements (unions, unemployed organisations, human rights 
NGOs, etc), several of  them decided to strongly support the new government, while others 
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remained in political opposition, and the FRENAPO alliance followed the same path. Its failure as a 




The experience of  FRENAPO was one of  the highest points in the resistance against neo-
liberalism in Argentina. It showed that it was possible to build a broad consensus to fight against the 
consequences of  the prevailing neo-liberal economic framework. In particular, it gave voice to those 
who claimed that the levels of  poverty and extreme poverty were unacceptable. 
There are many key lessons that explain why FRENAPO was successful. In particular, it is 
important to highlight that the alliance was able to combine local and national strategies, giving 
space to both national and locally based organisations to participate. 
The Argentinean Workers’ Union played an important role in the campaign. Although it was 
the largest organisation within the alliance by far, it did not push for a strategy solely based on 
labour rights and the traditional union agenda. The FRENAPO campaign justified its proposal 
linking the specific measures with citizenship rights, and that enabled the participation in the 
campaign of  many social organisations which were not directly involved in labour issues. 
The very existence of  FRENAPO is a valuable lesson. Indeed, had the same programme been 
put forward by the CTA on its own, it would not have been possible to build such a broad 
consensus around the proposal. The CTA did not monopolise conduct within the alliance, opening 
spaces for the rest of  the members of  the alliance to occupy positions in the campaign. Still, as 
many leaders of  FRENAPO recognised, the campaign was only successful as a defensive strategy. 
Víctor De Gennaro, former General Secretary of  the CTA, some years later had accepted that while 
the popular referendum was a means for people to reject certain policies, it had not been enough to 
develop a real alliance that could govern the country. 
Hence, one of  the weaknesses of  FRENAPO lay in its own conception. The basic idea of  the 
proposal was that there were plenty of  resources in the Argentinean economy, thus the problem was 
merely one of  income redistribution. This starting point did not take into account that Argentina 
was facing a huge economic crisis and that implementing the measures that FRENAPO was pushing 
for would have required a complete change in the neo-liberal economic framework. 
The origins of  this crisis could be traced back to the economic policies implemented by the 
military government between 1976 and 1983, which were reinforced after 1991 by a centre–right 
government. As a consequence of  these measures, the Argentinean economy was ruled for more 
than two decades by financial capital, which subordinated the rest of  the economy, particularly 
industry, to its own interests. This meant that the FRENAPO initiative was not only fighting against 
the social consequences of  that economic framework. That is, the real meaning of  the FRENAPO 
proposal implied not only a single problem of  income redistribution, but a broad objection to the 
economic, social and political order that had ruled the country since 1976. 
The FRENAPO campaign had no strategy to deal with this bigger challenge. In order to have 
such a strategy, it would have been necessary to have many more political and economic discussions 
and definitions, which would have probably put many obstacles in the process of  building a broad 
alliance. At that point, it was possible to confront the ruling economic and political order during the 
1990s, but it was not so simple to elaborate a comprehensive proposal on what to do after neo-
liberalism. FRENAPO would have faced a dilemma it was not prepared for: Was it its main objective 
to go beyond capitalism? Or was the objective just to re-establish the welfare state in Argentina? 
And was it possible, given the changes in global capitalism at the beginning of  the twenty-first 
century, to go back to an accumulation pattern based on an internal market and wealth 
redistribution?  
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From this point of  view, the FRENAPO campaign could only allow numerous organisations 
and people to channel their frustration because of  the consequences of  twenty-five years of  neo-
liberalism. Once they had expressed that frustration, it was necessary to show them what to do 
about numerous key issues in the economic and political fields. The organisations that supported the 
FRENAPO campaign had no solid answers to this bigger challenge, and the broad alliance 
eventually crumbled. In particular, the arrival of  a centre–left government in Argentina in 2003 was 
the last chapter in the alliance, since many organisations joined the government. 
These are the main sources of  the failure and success of  FRENAPO. As we have described, 
the campaign could not achieve its objectives. Nevertheless, it had a strong influence in the following 
years since it was able to build a social consensus around the importance of  universal social policies. 
In particular, two of  the most important social measures implemented by the new administration – 
the Universal Child Allocation and the changes in the pension system – are part of  FRENAPO’s 
legacy. From this point of  view, it can be stressed that the campaign which developed in December 
2001, in the middle of  the largest economic crisis that Argentina faced in its history, was quite 
successful. Not only did it stop the increase of  poverty, extreme poverty and inequality, but it also 




1 The author would like to thank Michelle Williams and Florencia Rodríguez for comments on 
previous versions of  this article. 
2 I joined the FRENAPO in 2000 as a member of  a human rights organisation. The information 
used for this article comes from different sources, including my own experience during those 
months. The final conclusions are part of  a debate that took place in the following years with 
colleagues who were part of  that experience.   
3 There is no statistical information about the unemployment rate, poverty or extreme poverty prior 
to the 1950s or, in certain cases, the 1970s. Thus it is not possible to extend this comparison to the 
first half  of  the twentieth century. 
4 This path included different measures such as the privatisation of  state companies, the deregulation 
of  the economy (in particular of  the labour market), the liberalisation of  trade (in particular the 
removal of  import barriers) and the securitisation of  property rights. 
5 Non-registered workers do not have access to the social security system (public pension system, 
protection in case of  diseases or accidents, etc.), and they are not covered by the collective 
bargaining process. In Argentina this category is used as a measure of  the informalisation of  the 
labour market. 
6 The Gini Index also suggested an improvement during the last decade, reaching 0.41 in 2012. 
7 In Argentina we define the blockage of  a street or road as a piquete, so the people who take part in 
that action are known as piqueteros. By the end of  the 1990s there were many organisations that 
defined themselves as piqueteros. The content of  their claims was quite similar; they demanded mainly 
jobs, but also food and houses; they also demonstrated because of  the situation of  the public service 
in general. 
8 This protest consisted of  placing a large tent in front of  the national parliament as part of  an 
action claiming an increase in the education budget. Many teachers coming from all over the country 
lived in the tent for several weeks, before being replaced by the next group. The tent, known as the 
White Tent, became a place of  meeting for different social and political movements that supported 
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the protest of  the teachers, including other unions, political parties, artists, sportsmen, etc. It is 
possible to see in this protest one important antecedent of  the FRENAPO campaign. 
9 The CGT was founded in 1930 and is the biggest federation in Argentina. Its affiliates are 
industrial organisations, its main objective is related to the working conditions of  formal workers, 
and its strategy has been characterised as neo-corporatist. CTA, on the other hand, has been 
described as a social movement union, whose objectives are not limited by the situation of  formal 
workers. The CTA’s strategy during the 1990s included claims for grants for unemployed people, 
demands for social policies such as building houses for poor people and massive access to health 
services, the recognition of  land rights for peasants and indigenous people, etc. A brief  overview of  
these two different approaches can be found in Etchemendy and Collier (2007) and Ferrero and 
Gurrera (2007). 
10 It is also interesting to note that today, over a decade years after the crisis in December 2001, the 
concept of  structural adjustment still remains unpopular for the majority of  the population, and for 
that reason it is not possible for the government to implement this kind of  adjustment without 
facing strong opposition from the people. 
11 The FRENAPO proposal was inspired by the theoretical approaches that suggested the 
importance of  implementing public policies in order to guarantee a basic income for every citizen in 
each country. These ideas were developed in Europe by authors such as Van Parijs (2004). In 
Argentina there were also many authors who pushed for these kinds of  measures during the 1990s, 
for example Lo Vuolo et al. (1998). 
12 By the time of  FRENAPO, there was a fixed exchange rate with the US dollar – 1 A$ = 1 US$. 
13 In the following years the Universal Children Grant was periodically increased. In 2013 the rate 
was A$460 per child per month. Updating of  the nominal value avoids deterioration in real terms. 
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